Synergy Accountability

How the world has changed since my last post in February!  Now that 2020 craziness has finally leveled off (knock wood) we can continue with our series on synergies.  As promised this edition will focus on establishing accountability for synergy realization.
 
3 general rules should be applied when determine who should be held accountable for synergy realization.  The first general rule is as follows:
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1. Accountability for synergies should align with span of control over the synergy realization efforts and the majority of all corresponding dependencies.

​Revisiting some content from our April, 2018 posts will be helpful in understanding how this rule applies to various deal types:

Deal Rationale Considerations and TOM Selection
Recall from February’s post that we identified 2 basic categories of deals:

• Overlapping deals address elasticity constraints, provide scale/leverage, and their primary value driver is cost synergies.
• Complementary deals add scope (geographies, offers, innovation, capabilities, etc.) and their primary value driver is extra-accretive revenue synergies.

Overlapping deals will usually optimize at full, or nearly full, integration.  This is because a greater degree of integration scope generally maximizes cost synergies by providing for the elimination of duplicate “W’s” (who, what, where, which) per our “5 W’s” model.  Additionally, revenue synergies tend to be either unaffected or even optimized at higher levels of integration.  For example, additional revenue synergies could result from cross-selling, raising prices, bundling offers, etc.  The greater the overlap between target and acquirer, the more this tends to hold true.

Complimentary deals have much greater variability in optimal TOMs, but there is a general rule that can be applied:

The greater the level of innovation or creativity implicit in the revenue synergies, the lower the level of optimal integration

The table below provides a general outline of where most complementary deals will optimize:

Rationale	Most Common Ideal TOM
Geographic Expansion	Interim TOM until capable of operating End-state TOM of either full or heavy partial integration to realize cost synergies
Portfolio Expansion: Mature Offers	Full integration as soon as practical to facilitate joint portfolio management and realize cost synergies
Innovation, R&D, Expansion, Immature Offers	Minimum integration, so as not to disrupt the creative flow and/or lose key talent

​As recalled above, complimentary deals have a wider array of target operating models than do overlapping transactions and the optimal accountability structure also varies accordingly.  A second general rule of synergy accountability can be applied as follows:
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2. The greater the reliance on extra-accretive revenue synergies, the more accountability and control should (usually) rest with the acquiring business unit and centralized management should be minimized.

The key here is the phrase "extra-accretive", indicating that the revenue is to come from new innovations, not just the addition of mature markets, offers, etc. that result in a one-plus-one-equals-two sum.  Often such synergies require careful attention to talent retention and a focus on creativity, innovation, and speed to market.  The acquiring business should focus on the required portfolio and/or talent activities that will result in value capture.  An IMO will still be very useful in the diligence to first 100 days phases of the transaction to ensure coordination, smooth onboarding, clear communications, capture of lessons learned, etc.; however, centralized program management should usually be discontinued after the first post-close phase and the business unit can assume responsibility- and synergy accountability- thereafter.

This rule also highlights why serial acquirers should always have an established “minimum TOM” that defines the minimum integration to meet legal, regulatory, and “must-have” corporate policy requirements.  Up-front agreement on a minimum TOM will allow BU leadership maximum flexibility.  For instance they may choose to leave many back-office processes in an as-is state or even outsource some activities to free up additional bandwidth.  Regardless, being unshackled from the constraints of a highly-structured and standardized back office allows leaders to focus on the desired revenue growth unencumbered by the workload and distraction of a large integration program.

The third general rule can be applied to nearly all overlapping deals as well as many complementary deals where the synergies are primarily accretive:

3. The broader the synergy model, the narrower the ideal accountability should be, or the more comprehensive the synergy model, the greater the degree of centralization for deal outcome accountability

Dependencies are a key driver when applying this rule.  A heavy or full integration that reaches across much of the business will require extensive planning, communications, coordination, and stakeholder management. The absence of a robust, well-sponsored, and centralized IMO foments discord and undermines value capture.  The acquiring BU has no desire to learn the intricacies of the ERP tax data model for instance, and the inevitable “but we do this today” or “can’t we do this manually” will equally frustrate administrative staff.  And there are even more complexities if back office activities are outsourced, as it is almost certain that the negotiators of those contracts aren’t in the acquiring business unit.  As such what often happens is blaming, undermining, rework, and a loss of focus on deal outcomes.  Setting up a centralized program office not only ensures a balanced approach to addressing dependencies across the business but can also create a "lightning rod" effect, centralizing any tensions and helping to maintain a spirit of cooperation between teams with differing priorities. 

Effective governance is critical when centralizing complex, broad-reaching programs. The executive sponsor should ideally be a member of the C-suite, or at least have a substantial span of control and ultimate accountability for all outcomes, ensuring that Rule 1 above isn't violated.  While this may seem like common sense, neglecting sponsorship while leaving accountability with the IMO is a surprisingly common error on transactions that fail to achieve value capture.  Furthermore, the executive sponsor should have the authority to align performance and incentive structures to value capture objectives to facilitate focus and cooperation and to prevent conflicting goals from hampering progress.

On such complex integrations the level of dependencies will remain high for some time and early synergy targets are often planned for realization during this time.  Centralized program management via an IMO (integration management office) is the best way to ensure that all milestones required to meet these objectives are achieved.  To be more blunt, and IMO helps produce more value capture with less finger-pointing.  As dependencies are cleared centralized management can be scaled back if desired, and synergy accountability transitioned to the business along with any remaining tasks.